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У пропонованій статті проаналізовано відображення дипломатичної та військової діяльності 
миротворчої місії Ж. Бартелемі під час польсько-української війни 1918–1919 рр. у працях Михайла Ло- 
зинського. Розглянуто причетність М. Лозинського до важливих зовнішньополітичних акцій ЗОУНР, а 
саме його безпосередню участь у перемовинах з вище згаданою місією країн Антанти та особистий 
погляд дипломата на ці події. 
Запропонована стаття присвячується ґрунтовному аналізу дипломатичних аспектів у наукових 
роботах М. Лозинського та розкриваються погляди автора в питанні наслідків діяльності місії Антан- 
ти під проводом Ж. Бартелемі щодо майбутнього ЗОУНР. 
Теперішній етап розвитку історичної науки в Україні дає можливість переосмислити і зверну- 
тися до вивчення життя та діяльності осіб, які брали активну участь у національно-визвольному русі 
українського народу 1917–1923 рр. Однак одним із найважливих завдань сучасної історичної науки та 
дипломатії є дослідження не лише життєвого шляху знакових персоналій, а й змісту їх професійної 
діяльності та її впливу на суспільно-політичні процеси. 
Важливим є питання вивчення наукових надбань фахівців попередніх поколінь, які заклали 
підвалини розвитку сучасної української науки. У такому контексті ми розглядаємо праці та саму 
постать М. Лозинського, який увійшов в історію насамперед як громадський діяч, член уряду ЗОУНР, 
дипломат, науковець і публіцист. 
Ключові слова: Михайло Лозинський, Східна Галичина, ЗУНР, Польща, Ж. Бартелемі, миро- 
творча місія, польсько-українська війна. 
 
During the existence of the Soviet totalitarian regime, a large number of names of Ukrainian 
scholars, owing to ideological restrictions, were silenced, and their scientific achievements remained 
outside the context of the science’s development. It’s need to include the well-known Ukrainian public 
and political figure M. Lozуnskyі to them, who stood at the origins of the Ukrainian national liberation 
idea, was one of its outstanding creators. 
The historian I. Kedrin, characterizing M. Lozynskyі, noted that he was “a person with high 
education, a publicist, a politician, a former member of the State Secretariat of the WUPR, and later a 
member of his delegation to the World Conference in Paris, was the first-rate connoisseur of the then- 
historical events and one of the few connoisseurs of various backstage machinations”1. 
The relevance of this study is primarily determined by the generalization of the scientific 
heritage of M. Lozynskyі, the determination of his assessment of the diplomatic and military efforts 
which were made during the Paris Peace Conference, the interference of the Supreme Council of the 
Entente in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, in connection with which the Ukrainian side faced with a 
dictate and was forced to the truce. 
As a result, the unacceptable conditions imposed by the mission led by J. Bartellemі “under 
the dictation” of the Poles, according to M. Lozynskyі, pushed the WRUPR government to take 
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 decisive action. The purpose of the article is an attempt to analyze M. Lozуnskyі scientific and 
historical heritage in the context of the activities of the peacekeeping mission of J. Bartellemі y in 
resolving the conflict between Poland and the WRUPR, and also to highlight his vision of the 
processes that took place in Eastern Galicia during the specified period. 
M. Lozynskyі entered as a well-known political figure, a scientist, a publicist and an 
interpreter in the Ukrainian public opinion of the first third of the XX century. 
The collapse of the Austro-Hungary in the autumn of 1918, the proclamation of the WUPR, 
the beginning of the Polish-Ukrainian war, prompted M. Lozynskyі to become an active participant in 
the state-building process in the western Ukrainian lands. In early November 1918, he was introduced 
into the Ukrainian National Council (UNС), in which he conducted the active state-building work. 
From the first days of its existence, the ZUNR suffered aggression from Poland and territorial 
losses, while the process of building the foundations of statehood only began. As to these events, 
M. Lozynskyі recalled: “The biggest jury of the WRUPR government was a war with Poland. At first, 
the main hopes are laid upon the help of Great Ukraine, saying that with such assistance, Polacians 
will be able to propel the ethnographic borders of Eastern Galicia up to the ethnographic borders of the 
Eastern Galicia and make them to conclude as if not peace, then at least a truce on the basis of 
ensuring the ethnographic borders of the Ukrainian territory. The rest the Peace Conference will make 
in Paris, where UPR (Ukrainian People’s Republic) had sent its delegation. The Peace Conference 
recognizes the UPR and according to the principle of self-determination of peoples to correct the 
borders’s deal”2. 
However, the Directory’s authority, as a result of the capture of the Bіlshоvуk forces of the 
strategic initiative during January 1919, lost its campaign on the Left Bank and in the beginning of 
February the troops of the UPR retreated to the right bank of the Dniprо. On February 5, 1919, 
Ukrainian troops left Kiev and had been retreating every time closer to the Galician borders. The 
WRUPR was forced to send the military assistance to the Directory. For such minds, the Galician 
government decided to act independently. Western Ukrainians also hoped for help from the Entente 
countries. They believed in its statement that Poland had to rebel only on Polish lands (Part VIII of the 
Versailles’ Treaty) And Eastern Galicia is originally the Ukrainian land, the WRUPR government 
believed: Antanta will say to the Poles to stop an aggressive war against Eastern Galicia. M. Lo- 
zynskyі rightly remarked: “This Ukrainian faith is awaiting for great disappointment”3. 
In early February 1919, the command of the UGA (Ukrainian Galician Army), reorganizing 
the troops and bringing the number of front lines about 55–60 thousand people, decided to hold the so- 
called Vovchukhov offensive for the liberation of the capital of the WRUPR of Lviv and Przemysl and 
the subsequent exit to the line of the river Sian. Already on February 17, 1919, by attacking the Polish 
positions along the Sudova Vyshnia – Gorodok 3rd Galician Corps came out very close to the Lviv – 
Peremyshl railway line. Thus, the first part of the operational plan, which included the environment of 
Lviv, was practically fulfilled. However, the successful begining of operation was stopped at the 
request of the Supreme Council of the Entente States, which sent a mission to Lviv, led by French 
General J. Bartellemi for the talkss with the government the WRUPR
4
. In February 1919, M. Lozyns- 
kyi, as a member of the Ukrainian delegation, participated in negotiations with the Entente J. Bartel- 
lemі, who proposed the belligerents the truce. 
On February 22, 1919, the talks began in the town Khodoriv with the participation of the 
commander  of  the  UGA  General  M.  Omelianovych-Pavlenko  and  the  peacekeeping  mission  of 
J. Bartellemi. The Entente mission included also English general C. de Viart, the American professor 
R. Lord, the Italian Major Stabile, etc/.. With regard to these events, M. Lozynskyi noted: “This 
commission, after a few weeks of life in Warsaw and Lviv, appealed to the Ukrainian side on February 
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 22, 1919, with the extortion of the termination of the weapon for the purpose of negotiating about the 
armistice. The extortion about the termination of the weapon was put down categorically, as conditio 
sine qua non negotiation of the armistice; when the Ukrainian side does not approve of this claim, this 
will mean that it rejects the intervention of the World Conference, and it will be responsible for the 
further conducting the war”5. The extortion about the termination of the weapon was put down catego- 
rically, as conditio sine qua non negotiation of the armistice; when the Ukrainian side does not appro- 
ve of this claim, this will mean that it rejects the intervention of the World Conference, and it will be 
responsible for the further conducting the war”6. Of course, such conditions were unacceptable for the 
Ukrainian side, given the successful development of the Vovchukhiv offensive operation. we will 
notice that the WRUPR was represented only by the military, who were even against a temporary 
armistice in the midst of an offensive. After a heated debate, an agreement was reached on the transfer 
of negotiations to Lviv. Contrary to the military, E. Petrushevуch eventually ordered the leaders of the 
Galician delegation in Lviv, Colonel M. Tarnavskyi and L. Bachynskyi, to sign an armistice 
agreement
7
. 
At that moment the military-strategic situation was Sian on the side of the WRUPR. The 
Galician army kept almost the whole of Eastern Galicia along the River, and in this controlled territory 
the “Polish wedge” crashed along the Przemysl – Lviv route. After a heated debate, an agreement was 
reached on the transfer of negotiations to Lviv.So, the WRUPR government only under the onslaught 
of threats to the Entente Commission agreed to a truce, which was set up around the front on February 
25, 1919 at 6 o’clock in the morning. On the same day, a delegation of the State Secretariat of the 
WRUPR went to Lviv for the conducting of the negotiations about the armistice with the following 
composition: the Secretary of State for Legal Affairs Osyp Burakynskyi, Dr. Stepan Vytvitskyi, Dr. My- 
khailo Lozynskyi, Dr. Volodymyr Okhrimovych, Volodymyr Temnitskyi, regiment. Guzhkovskyi, Ata- 
man Rozhankovskyi, regiment. Slusarchuk, the colonel. Fidelier and as an interpreter Bonn. The first 
information meeting of the Bartellemi mission and the WRUPR delegation was held on February 26, 
during the course of the discussions, as M. Lozinskyі recalled, it was clear that the “allianty” were well- 
informed by the Poles in their favor. The evidence of the Ukrainian side had no effect on their decision. 
The same day, in the presence of the Bartellemi mission, was conducted the joint meeting of the 
delegations of the WRUPR and Poland. The main problem around which there was a dispute, was the 
question of demarcation line. But on this basis, the parties did not reach agreement
8
. 
The talks in Lviv took place under the brutal pressure of the Entente commissars who tried in 
every way to act in favor of the Poles and treated to the representatives of the WRUPR superficialy. 
M. Lozynskyi wrote: “Thanks to the Poles, who apparently had certain commissions of Bartellemi 
commission for their cause, this meeting was merely an annoying comedy. On our request of the line 
of Sian, the Poles responded with the demand of the Zbruch line When our delegation, in spite of all 
the apparent clues, began to discuss seriously and pointed on the possibility of the above-mentioned 
steps in defining a democratic line, the Poles, as the longest concession, filed the line Mount Popadia – 
Kalush – Halych – Rohatyn – Peremyshliany – Berestechko. It is obvious that the meeting was ended 
with the statement that the parties can not reach an understanding”9. 
In the negotiations with the Poles, Simon Petliura, head of the UPR Directorate, was also 
interested:  “At  the  same  time,  finding out  about the arrival  of J. Bartellemi,  on February 24, 1919, 
S. Petliura arrived in Stanislavov, and a day later he met with E. Petrushevych. The main Ataman 
advised the members of the Galician delegation to accept the proposals of General Bartellemi, because 
it will open the way for Ukraine to be recognized in Europe and will be able to get help with 
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 ammunition and military goods to continue the struggle for independence”. He also expressed this 
position in a letter to the genera M. Udovichenko: “Although the demarcation line did not meet the 
interests of the Galician people, I insisted on accepting it, because we would have achieved this: a) the 
actual recognition of Ukraine by the Entente; b) would be have some possibilities to create the bases 
for delivery of ammunition from Europe; c) would rely on Europe in our struggle against the 
Bolsheviks – ostensibly, with Moscow. Galicians, with the help of Omelianovych-Pavlenko, who has 
never been guided in state affairs, rejected these conditions ...” At this time, M. Lozynskyi also 
considered it is necessary to accept the circumstances of a truce, because it would have allowed to 
strengthen Galician statehood and to save it to resolve the political situation of the east of Europe. 
However, E. Petrushevych was guided by his own motives. After all, the people of Galicia could not 
understand such actions – “having a large army and almost equally holding in the fight against the 
Poles, to give the capital of the region and an industrial important area”10. 
On February 27, 1919, J. Bartellemi’s comission with the delegation of the WRUPR went for 
Hodorov, then the seat of the main UGA apartment, to see the main ataman S. Petliura, who “came 
there with the President of the UNC E. Petrushevych and the president of the State Secretariat C. Go- 
lubovych...”11. Bartellemi’s peacekeeping mission wanted to know what strength Petliura represented 
to fight Bolshevik Russia. In his turn, Petliura emphasized that Ukraine represents a great moral force 
that can be turned into a real military force, depending on whether the Entente recognizes the status of 
the UPR and will give the young state financial and technical assistance. 
On this occasion, M. Lozynskyi recalled: “Regarding to Galicia, S. Petliura noted only in 
general that the Ukrainian nation can only turn its full force against Bolshevism, when it will have a 
secured nationality existence from the West. As clearly as Golubovich and Petrushevich demanded 
from Petliura, he did not decsded and didn’t declared that the retention of the Eastern Galicia in the 
ethnographic borders of the Ukrainian People’s Republic is an unconditional demanding of the whole 
of Ukraine. It seems that even then Petliura was ready to make concessions at the expense of Eastern 
Galicia, to get peace with Poland for them and the recognition of the Entente”12. 
In his work “Galicia in 1918–1920” M. Lozynskyi bitterly noted that in terms of foreign  
policy relations between the governments of the WRUPR and the UPR consisted so that “... the case of 
the war with Poland for Eastern Galicia and the right to inheritance of Austria-Hungary were the 
affairs of the Western Region, and all the other cases – the affair of the whole Ukrainian People’s 
Republic”13. 
Before giving the project of the the armistice, J. Bartellemi pronounced the speech, after that 
M. Lozynskyi made a conclusion that “all this speech indicated that the decision of the commission 
wasn’t in our favor. To make us to accept the wrong decision, the general. Bartellemi on the one hand 
painted the strength of the poles with the bright paints, which is preparing for us, and on the other  
hand the wrath of the Entente, which will fall upon us, and on the other hand, those graces of the 
Entente that await to us when we make a decision”14. 
On February 28, 1919, the Bartellemi mission offered the delegation of the WRUPR the 
project of armistice. On the basis of this project, Poland have to receive not only a small part of 
Eastern Galicia, which was still conquered, but the WRUPR had to concede Poland with large areas of 
the Ukrainian territory, which UGA held firmly in its hands, together with oil fields on the vicinity of 
Drohobych and Borislav, which constituted the main article of the economic’s forces of the WRUPR. 
In general, Galicians had to give way to about 1/3 of their own territory of Eastern Galicia. 
Representatives of the Entente did not express any real guarantees regarding the future of Galicia. As 
to the project, M. Lozynskyi made the following conclusion: “It is clear from all this that the project of 
the ceasefire, which is proposed by the Bartellemi commission, was a one-sided dictate, which the 
commission, decided to throw Ukrainians on the basis of understanding with the Poles. And the 
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 comedy of negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation was arranged when the project has already 
decided and made”15. M. Lozynskyi, as a member of the WRUPR delegation, stated that “in the sense 
of moral responsibility to his people, the Ukrainian government could not accept such conditions of 
the armistice. It was compelled to decide to continue defending of native lands with the blood of its 
sons, and asked the Entente’s states to find out the reasons why it could not accept the project of 
Bertellemi commission and asked for a new, fair solution”16. It should be noted that the denial of the 
Government of the WRUPR significantly complicated the activities of the delegation at a conference 
in Paris, where they began to give greater preferences to the Poles. 
On February 28, 1919, General J. Bartellemi warned WUPR representatives O. Burachуnskyi, 
S. Vytvytskyі and M. Lozynskyi for the last time: if the Galician people do not accept the peace, they 
will soon be sorry for having to deal with the army of General Galler. Receiving the armistice project, 
the Ukrainian delegation left Lviv on the same day to transfer it to the State Secretariat of the 
WRUPR. After reviewing this project, the Western Ukrainian government sent the radiotelegram to 
Entente countries on March 4, 1919. It was mentioned there that “... the decision of this mission 
trampled on the principle of self-determination of peoples and became on the side of Polish 
imperialism. In this decision, the mission has sown in our people a mistrust to the Entente and to those 
high principles of the courage that the Entente proclaimed... we are forced to fight with Poles to 
defense our land... we want to live in peace and friendship with the states of the Entente and hope for 
their help to fight the Polish invasion... we are ready to stop the military steps against the Poles at any 
moment, but on the basis of a fair decision that will free our territory from the Polish invasion”17. 
M. Lozynskyі recalled that despite of the great desire to support the good relations with 
Entente, the delegation of the WRUPR could not accept the shameful proposals. Galician Ukrainians, 
whether it was at the level of the government representative at the negotiations of M. Lozynskyi, or at 
the level of the ordinary archer, the UGA could not accept the offer of the Entente mission. “We can 
not get along with the Poles – wrote on April 29, 1919 in the Stanislavov newspaper “Svoboda” the 
officer of the military press Taras Franko. – They crave from us the line of the Buh River, the bridge 
Berezhan, Stryi and the petroleum mines near Drohobych, and this Ukrainian can not accept any 
way”18. So, at that time when the WRUPR government announced its decision, that all proceeded in 
such way to reject the project of J. Bartellemi’s mission. 
The researchers of the Polish-Ukrainian war often describe the failure of the Hodogrow talks 
regarding to the truce in February 1919 under the auspices of the Paris Peace Conference as a key 
moment in the war, as he has identified a radical shift in the politics of the Entente leadership in favor 
of Poland. First of all, this accelerated the expulsion of the army of Galler to Poland, whose presence 
led to the decision of the fate of war in Poland’s interests. The mass media of Western European 
countries, in particular France and Britain, used the failure of the Bartellemi mission for the formation 
anti-Ukrainian sentiment in the international community. Some researchers argue that the breakup of 
the armistice has damaged the leadership of the WRUPR, which has chosen the strategy of the fatalist: 
either all or nothing. Some believed that it was necessary to preserve an independent state at least any 
on a part of the region’s territory. M. Lozynskyi, a diplomat, denied them, who remarked that the 
adoption of the Bartellemi project would not save the Ukrainian state from either Poland or from 
Russia
19
. 
Thus, the Entente’s attempt to reach the peace at the expense of the WUPR and return the two 
warring armies to the east, against the Bolsheviks, failed. However, the Paris truce imposed by the 
warring parties was used differently. The Poles significantly strengthened their position thanks to the 
Galler’s army who was sent to the East Galicia, which determined the result of the war. M. Lozynskyi 
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 fairly summed up: “in this war, at first the World Conference acted as an intermediary, and then as a 
jud”20. 
M. Lozynsky’s activities were properly evaluated and on March 10, 1919, at a meeting of the 
Council of the Ukrainian National Council, he was appointed as a fellow (deputy) secretary of the sta- 
te for foreign affairs of the WRUPR and instructed by the secretariat, as Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs V. Panaieko was at the Paris Peaceful Conference as deputy Head of the UPR delegation
21
. 
So, against the background of socio-political processes of the West Ukrainian lands of the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. M. Lozynskyі became an active participant in Ukrainian national life. 
M. Lozynskyi’s state-building and diplomatic talent is characterized by new theoretical positions, 
originality of thoughts, which became relevant in modern conditions. 
 
 
ДІЯЛЬНІСТЬ МИРОТВОРЧОЇ МІСІЇ Ж. БАРТЕЛЕМІ ПІД ЧАС ПОЛЬСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ 
ВІЙНИ 1918–1919 рр. У ПРАЦЯХ МИХАЙЛА ЛОЗИНСЬКОГО 
 
Yevhen LYZEN 
State Pedagogical University 
“Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University”, 
Department of World History, 
Shevchenko St., 57, 76018, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine 
e-mail: luge82@ukr.net 
 
Summary 
The article deals with the reflection of the diplomatic and military activity of the peacekeeping mission 
of J. Bartellemi during the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918–1919 in the writings of Mykhailo Lozynskyi. It is 
сonsidered the involvement of M. Lozynskyi in important foreign-policy actions of the WUPR (Western Ukrai- 
nian People’s Republic), namely, his direct participation in negotiations with the aforementioned mission of the 
Entente countries and the personal view of the diplomat on these events. 
Keywords: M. Lozynskyi, Eastern Galicia, WRUPR (Western Ukrainian People’s Republic), Poland, 
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